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Excess Liability: An Attorney's




The following is an update of a 1973 article that was prepared for the
Defense Research Institute, Inc. on the subject of excess liability.' The
current law of excess liability was in its infancy at that time, so it
seemed altogether fitting to enhance the earlier discussion in order to
chart a proper course for insurance defense counsel.
To almost no defense counsel's surprise, the rapid evolution in the
law of excess liability has mandated significant changes in claims settle-
ment procedures. Although in days past the insurance industry could
in some instances utilize shrewd tactics to escape liability, continued
adherence to this overly protective practice today will prove penny-
wise and pound-foolish. As one writer has noted, these dilatory tactics
provided the raw material for the development of the law of excess
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liability.2
Bad faith liability-usually stated as the breach of an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing-originated not in insurance law,
but instead from contract principles in preserving the right of each
party to the fruits of his bargain. Insurance law has nevertheless been
the primary area of litigation for this type of action from its inception.
California courts first recognized the insured's right of action against
the insurer for unreasonable conduct in the settlement of claims against
the insured in Brown v. Guarantee Insurance Co. I and Communale v.
Traders & General Insurance Co. 4 Both of these decisions arose out of
third party claims, which are to be distinguished from what is termed
first party claims, in that the former deals with actions based upon the
insurer's conduct which risks potential liability of the insured over the
policy limits in suits against the insured. Both Brown and Communale
held that insurers are bound by a duty of good faith and fair dealing in
the process of settlement negotiation.
Further, these cases imposed a reciprocal duty upon the parties to
refrain from doing anything to injure the right of the other to receive
the benefits of the contract.' While the Brown court based its decision
upon contract theory, Communale held this duty to be founded in tort
principles as well, allowing plaintiff his choice of action. Nearly a dec-
ade later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Communale in Crisci v. Secur-
ity Insurance Co. ,6 holding that the insurer must give as much
consideration to the financial interest of its insured, which turned upon
whether a prudent insurer would have accepted the settlement offer if it
alone were to be liable for the entire judgment.
In dictum, the Crisci court went even further to propose the imposi-
tion of strict liability upon insurers, stating:
The proposed rule is a simple one to apply and avoids the burdens of
a determination whether a settlement offer within the policy limits
was reasonable. The proposed rule would also eliminate the danger
that an insurer, faced with a settlement offer at or near the policy
limits, will reject it and gamble with the insured's money to further
its own interests. Moreover, it is not entirely clear that the proposed
rule would place a burden on insurers substantially greater than that
which is present under existing law.7
In 1974, the Supreme Court adopted the Crisci suggestions and re-
2. Turner, Excess Liabilt, in GENERAL REINSURANCE MONOGRAPH 13 (1974).
3. 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
4. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
5. Id at 658, 328 P.2d at 200.
6. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
7. Id at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
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versed the Appellate Court's decision in Johansen v. California State
Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau.8 In Johansen, plaintiff
Muriel Johansen and her husband brought suit against Gary Dearing,
minor son of the insured, for negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
The insurer disputed liability, but assumed the defense of the insured
under reservation of rights. Prior to trial against the insured, plaintiffs
offered to settle for the policy limits. Although in the subsequent trial
against the insurer, the insurer conceded the certainty of an excess
judgment, it refused to settle, maintaining it would only proffer the pol-
icy limits after judicial determination that coverage existed.
During the pendency of the action against the insured, the insurer
brought a declaratory relief action against the plaintiff and the insured.
The trial court found for the insurer, but this ruling was reversed on
appeal. The insurer then paid out the policy limits with interest. The
Johansens thereafter instituted a proceeding against the insurer for bad
faith, taking an assignment for the unpaid portion of the judgment.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the insurer, holding that
the insurer's bona fide belief that coverage did not exist immunized it,
since liability can only exist upon a finding of bad faith. In the under-
lying action, however, the insured admitted liability under advice of
counsel retained by the insurer; the Supreme Court, in the bad faith
action against the insurer, considered the overwhelming evidence
which indicated the existence of a substantial risk for a higher verdict
than that rendered.
The majority in Johansen refused to recognize the lower court's at-
tempt to use potential collusion between the insured and the attorney
representing the claimant as a basis for denying recovery in bad faith
actions. The court applied a "per se rule" of bad faith, holding: "[A]n
insurer's 'good faith', though erroneous, belief in non-coverage affords
no defense to liability flowing from the insurer's refusal to accept a
reasonable settlement offer. [Footnote omitted]". 9
ROYAL GLOBE CLAIMS
The newest assault upon the insurance industry came via the 1972
amendments to the Unfair Practices, Act.10 The Act, adopted in 1959,
was designed to thwart potential federal regulation of trade practices
by reserving control over insurance commerce to the state Insurance
8. 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975).
9. Id at 16, 538 P.2d at 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
10. CAL. INS. CODE §§790-790.10.
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Commissioner."
In 1972, the legislature added subdivision (h) to section 790.03,12
which sets forth thirteen proscribed unfair settlement practices. The
following are the most relevant illegal practices to this discussion:
(1) misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts or insurance policy
provisions relating to any coverage at issue;' 3 (2) failing to acknowl-
edge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect
to claims arising under insurance policies;' 4 (3) failing to confirm or
deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof of loss
requirements have been completed and submitted by the insured;' 5
(4) not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equita-
ble settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably
clear;' 6 (5) failing to provide promptly a reasonable explanation of the
basis relied on in the insurance policy, in relation to the facts or appli-
cable law, for the denial of a claim or for the offer of a compromise
settlement;' 7 (6) directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services
of an attorney.' 8
The Court first recognized an implied right of action under the Un-
fair Practices Act in Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,'9 a
suit involving restraint of trade. Greenberg arose as a class action seek-
ing damages, even though the sole remedial power of the Insurance
Commissioner under the Unfair Practices Act was the issuance of a
cease and desist order. The court required the Act to be read in the
light of other restraint of trade statutes outside the insurance industry
and held that the plaintiffs were not required to exhaust all administra-
tive remedies before the commissioner.'
With the door ajar, the Supreme Court again took the opportunity to
apply the holding of Greenberg to subdivision (h) and third party
claims in Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court.2' Royal Globe
involved a slip and fall action against a grocery store, in which plaintiff
joined in the suit the market's insurer and its independent adjuster as
an agent of the insurer. The plaintiffs claimed that the adjuster refused
to settle in good faith even though liability had become reasonably
11. Price, Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court: Right to Direct Suit Against an In-
surer bya Third Party Claimant, 31 HAsT. L. J. 1161, 1167-68 (1980).







19. 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973).
20. Id at 1001, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
21. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
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clear. The court vacated the trial court's ruling denying defendant's
demurrer, but held this action to be premature, in that the claim against
the insured must be concluded prior to the insured's bringing suit for
declaratory relief.22
In his dissent, Justice Richardson noted that the majority had abro-
gated the well settled rule that recovery for excess judgments was lim-
ited to the insured unless there was an assignment.23 Justice
Richardson stressed the majority's sidestepping of Murphy v. Allstate
Insurance Co. 24 by creating a weak, artificial distinction premised upon
the Unfair Practices Act. Murphy, he points out,25 expressly held that a
third party claimant has no direct cause of action against the insurer.
Royal Globe significantly altered the defense counsel's approach to
his obligations vis-it-vis the insured and insurer. In the first place, this
case requires the attorney to take immediate steps to investigate the
claim. More importantly, if the facts of this investigation demonstrate
"reasonably clear liability," which means that liability and damages
are clear, the attorney is required to initiate settlement negotiations
with the plaintiff, thereby tipping his hand. Failure by the carrier to do
so, or failure to thereafter effectuate a prompt settlement, forms the
prima facie case for further liability under Royal Globe. Such omis-
sions may also leave the attorney quite vulnerable to a legal malprac-
tice action for mishandling the claim.
The public policies to be promoted by similar vigorous implementa-
tion of the Unfair Practices Act were clearly enunciated in Avila v.
Travelers Insurance Co.26 These policies were as follows: (1) to facili-
tate prompt compensation of the injured person; (2) to encourage set-
tlement; and (3) to discourage litigation.27 The Avila court disregarded
the interests of the insured by requiring an expeditious settlement by
the insurer, even though such quick compensation to the injured could
thereby expose the insured to no coverage. This concern for the injured
party was adopted in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Superior Court.28
The court elevated the rights of the third party claimant over that of the
insured, holding that an insurance company is not guilty of bad faith or
negligence in paying out the policy limits to a seriously injured person,
despite the fact that this practice exposes its insured to no coverage, as,
22. Id at 892, 592 P.2d at 337, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
23. Id at 892-93, 592 P.2d at 337-41, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 850-54 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
24. 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976).
25. 23 Cal. 3d at 893, 592 P.2d at 337, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
26. 481 F. Supp. 431 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
27. Id at 437.
28. 114 Cal. App. 3d 49, 170 Cal. Rptr. 527 (1980).
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for example, in the case of a potential subsequent wrongful death
claim.29
Thus, the state of the law of excess liability has undergone a vast
transformation from its limited application in Brown v. Guarantee In-
surance Co. 30 Moreover, as many authorities have commented, there is
no indication that this area has reached its apex of development.
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S DUTIES AND PROBLEMS
Taking this background into account, the thrust of this discussion
will be to consider the practical problems of defense counsel whose cli-
ent is exposed to a judgment in excess of his policy limits. Such
problems have been the subject of considerable scrutiny since the deci-
sion in Lysick v. Walcolm.32 In the Lysick case, the claimant who had
recovered an excess judgment collected the policy limits, and through
an assignment brought suit against both the insurer and defense coun-
sel. The insurer settled, leaving defense counsel the only remaining
defendant. The court found for the insured's estate, holding that the
attorney had failed to inform the insured's estate of the conflicts of in-
terest between the insurer and insured. In addition, the court deter-
mined that the attorney had failed to advise the insured of its right to
retain independent counsel.33
Since the Lysick decision, it has become apparent that the attorney
compensated by the carrier to represent its insured must conscien-
tiously assess his position vis-A-vis the insurer-insured relation. As a
practical matter, it must be realistically conceded that the insurer's po-
sition may be somewhat more favorably considered than that of the
insured. After all, it is the insurer who controls the purse with which it
may curry favor and promote an atmosphere not unlike an employer-
employee relationship. On the other hand, the client-insured's value as
a future business asset to the attorney is negligible beyond the pending
litigation. Lysick was accordingly erected to serve as a warning beacon
to the attorney who is tempted to follow this natural inclination. If
there was any doubt as to the import of Lysick, the court in Klemm v.
Superior Court34 dispelled it when it unequivocally set forth the effect
of such a wrongful breach of the attorney's duty under Rule 5-102 of
the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct.
The Klemm court recants the strict standard set forth in Anderson v.
29. Id at 59, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
30. 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
31. Wagenseil, Royal Globe: Reasonably Unclear Liabilty for Insurers, 678 INs. L.J. 382
(July 1979).
32. 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968).
33. Id at 151, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
34. 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1977).
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Eaton," wherein the court stated:
[I]t is a violation of that duty for him to assume a position adverse or
antagonistic to his client without the latter's free and intelligent con-
sent given after full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances.
[Citation omitted]. By virtue of this rule an attorney is precluded
from assuming any relation which would prevent him from devoting
his entire energies to his client's interest. Nor does it matter that the
intention and motives are honest. This rule is designed not alone to
prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as
well to preclude the honest practitioner from putting himself in a
position where he may be required to choose between conflicting du-
ties, or be led to an attempt to reconcile conflicting interests, rather
than enforce to their full extent the rights of the interest which he
should alone represent. [Citation omitted].
Moreover, a breach of the attorney's fiduciary duty in representing the
insured can have far-reaching effects on the attorney's continued pro-
fessional practice-effects which may not be the subject of errors and
omissions coverage. The obligation of the attorney to the insured, even
though the attorney has been retained by the insurance carrier, must be
considered the same as if the client had personally retained him.
The attorney must presume that whatever he does or fails to do in
the representation of the insured client may be subject to the scrutiny of
a lay jury, with instructions to that jury based upon fiduciary princi-
ples. This poses obvious difficulty since the attorney, in representing
the insurance carrier, works with people who are thoroughly attuned to
the business of dealing with claims and litigation. On the other hand,
in representing an individual client, the attorney is generally dealing
with one who is unfamiliar with the problems involved in the litigation
process.
Logically, then, it would be incumbent upon the attorney to explain
to the insured each and every step of the litigation process, from the
time he is retained through the conclusion of the case by judgment or
settlement.
The duty of the attorney in this respect has been expressed as
follows:
He must disclose clearly all the facts relating to settlement to the in-
sured. He must apprise the insured of the risks and of the leverage
he has against the insurer. . . he must conduct himself as the in-
sured's advocate vis-A-vis the company in their struggle because of
the disparity in their knowledge and in their bargaining positions
36
35. 211 Cal. 113, 293 P.2d 788 (1930).
36. Gallagher, Problem of Defense Counsel Negotiating Settlement in Potential Excess Cases,
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However, this may be a practical impossibility, for even if an attor-
ney were capable of explaining all the contingencies, he would still face
the insurmountable obstacle of ascertaining just what the client under-
stood. As noted in the 1973 article, the attorney may find himself in a
plight similar to that of the physician. When faced with an allegation
that the client was not fully informed as to the possible risks of the
litigation process, it may be insufficient for him to be able to prove that
he performed his professional services impeccably. 7 In attempting to
satisfy the demands of the fiduciary duty imposed upon him to render
professional advice, the attorney must be aware of the potential need to
satisfy a finder of fact that he has met that duty. In some jurisdictions,
the mere fact that the individual practitioner conformed to the standard
of other practitioners does not preclude use of the informed consent
doctrine. Similarly, the individual attorney should not feel secure in
conforming to the standard of other practitioners in advising of the
risks of litigation. The court, in a recent medical malpractice case,
spoke of the standard to be applied in informed consent cases, using
language that has relevance for the attorney in his role of advising in-
sured clients:
The scope of a physician's duty to disclose is measured by the
amount of knowledge a patient needs in order to make an informed
choice. All information material to a patient's decision should be
given .8 . . . Material information is that which the physician
knows or should know would be regarded as significant by a reason-
able person in the patient's position when deciding to accept or reject
the recommended medical procedure. [Citation omitted]. To be ma-
terial, a fact must also be one which is not commonly appreciated.
[Citation omitted]. If the physician knows or should know of the
patient's unique concerns or lack offamiliarity with medical proce-
dures, this may expand the scope of required disclosure. [Citation
omitted].39
ADVISING AND PROTECTING THE INSURED-CLIENT
From the above discussion, it should be apparent that the attorney
must advise and protect the insured at all stages of the proceedings as if
the client were uninsured and possessed substantial assets. Such advice
and protection encompasses not only the tangible and intangible rights
in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INSURANCE PRACTICE 44, 46
(1971).
37. Costanzo, supra note 1, at 15.
38. Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 291, 611 P.2d 883, 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 308 (1980)
dungCobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
39. 27 Cal. 3d at 291, 611 P.2d at 905-06, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 311-12 (emphasis added).
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of the insured, but also a recognition of the inextricable interrelation-
ship between those assets and the insurance policy. Indeed, the policy
must be treated as an enhancement of the property rights of the in-
sured, as well as an independent protectable asset. This approach re-
quires a consideration of the insurance policy as protection afforded the
insured as to his other assets, both existing and future. If, therefore, in
the litigation process, a potential threat-no matter how remote-is
posed to the assets of the insured over and above the protection af-
forded by the insurance company limits, the attorney must advise the
insured to retain independent counsel in order to protect his individual
assets.
There are situations in which the insured himself may have a definite
monetary interest in not making a demand that the insurance company
settle within his policy limits. For example, the settlement in some
cases may result in higher premiums for future or existing coverages.
Moreover, the insured's professional standing may be a paramount fac-
tor (e.g., a doctor accused of malpractice or a manufacturer accused of
product design defects). However, counsel is more often dealing with
an individual who is not confronted with such collateral concerns.
CONSIDERED OPINION NEEDED
In order to fully protect the individual client, the attorney should
take immediate steps-whether or not a demand letter has been re-
ceived-to ascertain the facts necessary to give a considered opinion as
to: (1) the liability of the insured; and (2) the nature and extent of the
damages sustained by the claimant. Such procedure is both earnestly
desired by the carrier and essential to the individual client. In light of
Royal Globe, this recommended procedure may well be imposed by
law. The attorney must develop his plan accordingly, including confer-
ring with opposing counsel as necessary, to obtain the necessary
information.
If the investigation is thorough and well documented, the evaluation
will be reasonable and not susceptible to "bad judgment."4 As an-
other observer has noted:
The obligation is to defend a case, not a policy limit .... In short,
in all things related to investigation and defense the insurer should
behave as if its policy were unlimited. Any attempt to gear the inves-
tigation or defense to the policy limit rather than to the needs of the
case as a whole will risk failure to develop essential defensive evi-
dence thereby exposing the insurer to excess liability .... It may
40. Kennedy, Current Thinking on Excess Liabilit--An Insurer's View, in DEFENSE RE-
SEARCH INsTirTEr, ExcEss LuABILrry 7 (1973).
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also lay the insurer open to the charge that by reason of its inade-
quate investigation it was unable to make a good faith appraisal of
settlement value.41
If, upon receipt of the complaint or during discovery, a demand in
excess of policy limits is made, defense counsel should inform the car-
rier and insured of the rights and obligations of each party. Most im-
portantly, the insured should be advised of his right to independent
counsel if a conflict exists (i.e., when the insured's interest is not con-
gruent with that of the insurer). Also, the insured should be apprised of
his right to contribute toward settlement, and the insurer's pledge of
cooperation between its counsel and the insured should he choose to
retain independent counsel.
As soon as counsel receives information indicating "reasonably
clear" liability, a potential Royal Globe action makes it certain he
should take even greater care to avoid such settlement practices as re-
fusing to negotiate, waiting for plaintiff to forget the claim, or other
dilatory tactics. Defense counsel should also be alert to advise the
claims adjuster to avoid careless remarks in the claims file, as they are
more than likely discoverable in this type of action.
Even where no demand has been made, prudent counsel should
closely monitor the investigation and should prepare to initiate settle-
ment negotiations when and if the facts indicate reasonably clear liabil-
ity. This approach is equally sound when the demand is below or at
the policy limits. Here again the attorney must promptly inform the
insured and the carrier of the demand and the potential risks to each
party in the event it should be rejected.
In some situations, a demand for the policy limits is made before a
considered opinion can be given on either liability or damages. Where
a demand contains a limited time for its acceptance, it would appear
that both a practical and ethical solution is possible. A basis for con-
sidering the demand should be established in light of information
which counsel making the demand should be responsible for supplying.
The attorney should write a letter to plaintiff's counsel requesting all
information in his possession upon which his demand is based. Failure
to respond by the plaintiff's attorney would indicate that his demand
was not made in good faith.
Treating the demand and the litigation process as though the policy
had no limits may also afford a realistic approach in those jurisdictions
that impose what is tantamount to absolute liability for failure to settle.
41. Turner,.Avoiding Excess Liabiliy, in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, AvOIDINO EXCESS
LiAImr II (1967), reprinted in DEFENSE RESEARCH INsTrrTE, ExcEs LIABILITY 69 (1973).
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It may also have distinct advantages in those jurisdictions where the
question is one of bad faith, provided the insurer is cognizant of the
underwriting problems imposed in writing a policy which has limits
that may, in exceptional situations, be waived by the insurer.
Essentially, the same advice would apply in those situations where
the insured has no assets and probably never will. It would apply, for
example, where an estate has been established, the only item remaining
in the estate is the policy limits protection afforded the client, and there
is no possibility of a collectible excess judgment. The tendency of the
decisions has been to impose the same liability upon both the insurer
(and probably the attorney) as if the estate were a healthy entity with
substantial assets.42 However, it should be noted that there may be in-
stances where no liability for bad faith action will arise. The court in
Shapero v. Allstate4 3 held no cause of action will arise where there is no
possibility of damage to the insured. This case, however, may be lim-
ited to its peculiar facts (i.e., the plaintiffs attorney was also the em-
ployer of the defendant-decedent's administrator).
CONCLUSION
For the law of excess liability as it exists to date, the following is a set
of rules that should govern the conduct of defense counsel in advising
and protecting his clients in insurance cases. Counsel should:
(1) Always begin the investigation within a reasonable time and
stress to all parties the importance of avoiding unnecessary delays;
(2) Immediately write to the insured, informing him/her as to all
relevant facts already discovered and all applicable policy provisions.
Be sure the carrier notifies the insured of any reservation of rights
language the insurer intends to use should it be found later that no
coverage exists.
(3) Immediately write to the insurer to inform it of the steps which
are being taken or should be taken. It is vitally important that the
adjuster be alerted to potential discovery of the claims file.
(4) Upon formulation of an opinion that a verdict would most
likely be in excess of the policy limits or upon demand for such,
counsel must promptly advise the insured of: (a) his/her right to
independent counsel; (b) his/her right to contribute; and (c) the in-
sured's right that his/her representative receive the fullest coopera-
tion from the insurer's counsel.
(5) As soon as facts are received indicating "reasonably clear liabil-
ity," the carrier must be informed immediately that settlement nego-
tiations must promptly be initiated and the insured should be kept
42. Lysick v. Walcolm, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968).
43. 14 Cal. App. 3d 433, 92 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1971).
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advised. Thereafter, counsel should take the necessary steps to effec-
tuate this settlement.
(6) When faced with certain liability, counsel should advise the in-
surer to make advancements to the injured party. Also, counsel
should stress that the insurer not use the precarious financial condi-
tion of either the injured person or the insured to coerce settlement.
(7) Keep the insured and insurer frequently advised of any and all
progress in the defense of the claim. These reports should note the
risks to each party presently known and the suggested tactics to be
used in future discovery or settlement proceedings.
(8) Advise the carriers to continually educate their adjusters as to
those illegal practices set forth in the Unfair Practices Act. Counsel
should also avail himself of the adjusters for the purpose of answer-
ing questions relating to the application of the Act or advise the in-
surer to use its house counsel so as to clear up any doubt as to its
effect upon the carriers' procedures.
Perhaps, the best approach to the dilemma facing any defense lawyer
would include a closer personal relationship with the defendant-in-
sured, as well as a spirit of cooperation by the client-carrier. They must
build a unified defense effort, based on a recognition by all parties of
the respective rights and obligations of the insured-insurer clients vis-&-
vis the defense attorney.
